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Abstract
Background: The population in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) suffers poor health as manifested in high mortality rates
and low life expectancy. Economic growth has consistently been shown to be a major determinant of health
outcomes. However, even with good economic growth rates, it is not possible to achieve desired improvements in
health outcomes. Public spending on health (PSH) has long been viewed as a potential complement to economic
growth in improving health. However, the relationship between PSH and health outcomes is inconclusive and this
inconclusiveness may, in part, be explained by governance-related factors which mediate the impact of the former
on the latter. Little empirical work has been done in this regard on SSA. This paper investigates whether or not the
quality of governance (QoG) has a modifying effect on the impact of public health spending on health outcomes,
measured by under-five mortality (U5M) and life expectancy at birth (LE), in SSA.
Methods: Using two staged least squares regression technique on panel data from 43 countries in SSA over the
period 1996–2011, we estimated the effect of public spending on health and quality of governance U5M and LE,
controlling for GDP per capita and other socio-economic factors. We also interacted PSH and QoG to find out if the
latter has a modifying effect on the former’s impact on U5M and LE.
Results: Public spending on health has a statistically significant impact in improving health outcomes. Its direct
elasticity with respect to under-five mortality is between −0.09 and −0.11 while its semi-elasticity with respect to life
expectancy is between 0.35 and 0.60. Allowing for indirect effect of PSH spending via interaction with quality of
governance, we find that an improvement in QoG enhances the overall impact of PSH. In countries with higher
quality of governance, the overall elasticity of PSH with respect to under-five mortality is between −0.17 and −0.19
while in countries with lower quality of governance, it is about −0.09. The corresponding semi elasticities with
respect to life expectancy are about 6 in countries with higher QoG and about 3 in countries with lower QoG.
Discussion: Public spending on health improves health outcomes. Its impact is mediated by quality of governance,
having the higher impact on health outcomes in countries with higher quality of governance and lower impact in
countries with lower quality of governance. This may be due to increased efficiency in the use of available
resources and better allocation of the same as QoG improves.
Conclusion: Improving QoG would improve health outcomes in SSA. The same increase in PSH is twice as effective
in reducing U5M and increasing LE in countries with good QoG when compared with countries with poor QoG.
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Background
The population in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) suffers poor
health as manifested in high mortality rates and low life
expectance at birth, indicators widely used as aggregate
measures of a population’s health status. Life expectancy
at birth (LE) in SSA is at 57 years, the lowest across all
regions of the world. Under-five mortality rate (U5M) and
maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in SSA are the highest in
the world at 98 per 1000 live births and 510 per 100,000
respectively [1]. Both of these are twice as high as the
(arithmetic) mean for the developing countries which stand
at 53 per 1000 and 230 per 100,000 respectively. Hence, the
region bears the bulk of global child and maternal mortal-
ity: more than 40 % of all global child deaths and more than
50 % of all maternal deaths occur in SSA [2].
Progress in improving health status in SSA has been slow,
as measured by progress to the targets of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs had set targets of
reduction, between 1990 and 2015, of 67 % in U5M (MDG
number 4) and 75 % in MMR (MDG number 5). With
regard to these, the region had achieved, by 2013, only
45 % reduction in U5M and 48 % in MMR [1]. At these
rates of progress, SSA as a whole will miss the MDG targets
on both of these goals. It has been estimated only nine
countries in the region, out of a samples of 36, will achieve
their targets on MDG number 4 at the current rates of re-
duction [3].
Improved health status is not only a goal in its own right
but also a prerequisite for the development process since
good health is an important form of human capital. There-
fore, it is imperative when planning for the post-2015 devel-
opment agenda to address the question “what can be done
to speed up progress in improving health status?” As previ-
ous studies show, the amount of resources in the health
sector, as measured by public spending on health (PSH), is
a potentially important determinant but in itself does not
guarantee improved health outcomes. Efficiency in the use
of the available resources is necessary to secure the desired
improvements [4–6]. Quality of governance (QoG) is con-
sidered not only as an important determinant of health out-
comes but also of efficiency of public spending on health.
This paper intends to examine the role of quality of govern-
ance in modifying the effectiveness of PSH in improving
health status in Sub Saharan Africa. In doing so it will shed
light on the likely extent to which health outcomes in the
region can be improved by increasing efficiency in the use
of the available resources.
We specifically focus on SSA for two related reasons.
Firstly, it is the region with the worst health outcomes,
as highlighted above. Secondly, studies on efficiency of
health expenditure have consistently shown that SSA is less
efficient in converting health expenditure into improved
health status compared to other developing regions. Gupta
and Verhoeven employed the Free Disposal Hull technique
to estimate the efficiency of government health expenditure
on health outcomes in developing countries, controlling for
the impact of the level of economic development. They
concluded that African economies are inefficient in provid-
ing health services relative to their Asian and Western
Hemisphere peers [7]. Grigoli and Kapsoli quantified the
inefficiency of public health expenditure for emerging and
developing economies using a stochastic frontier model
that controls for the socioeconomic determinants of health
[8]. Their results show that African economies have the
lowest efficiency levels. Similar conclusions have been
reached by others [9–12].
Literature review
Economic growth and health outcomes
The search for major socioeconomic determinants of good
health has been a preoccupation of researchers and policy-
makers for decades. Economic growth (sustained increase
in income per capita) has consistently been shown to be a
major determinant of health outcomes [13, 14]. However,
economic growth alone is not adequate to improve health
status to desired levels; for example, it is not adequate to
reach the MDG targets. As Bokhari [15] argues, the reduc-
tion in under-five mortality implied by typical income
elasticity of under-five mortality (defined here as the per-
centage point change in U5M in response to a 1 % change
in income) is rather low, and even with good economic
growth rates there is a modest effect [15]. This can be
illustrated using a pooled income/U5M elasticity of 0.38
for SSA from a systematic review of 24 studies [16], and
an economic growth rate of 5 %, the average growth rate
for Africa for the past decade [17]. A simple projection is
that over the 15 years of MDG implementation from 2000
to 2015, the reduction in U5M would be 25 % against the
MDG target of 67 %. That is, economic growth alone is
not enough to “produce” good health or reach the MDG.
Public spending on health, quality of governance and
health outcomes
PSH has long been viewed as a potential complement to
economic growth in improving health status. However,
there is debate in the literature about the effectiveness of
PSH in improving health outcomes. Musgrove summa-
rized most of the earlier cross-country studies on this
topic and concluded that while PSH shows little relation
to under-five mortality (which is more closely related to
nutrition, water and sanitation) there is an association
with life expectancy [18]. Several studies have also drawn
conclusions of no association between PSH and health out-
comes. Applying the instrumental variable (two staged least
squares) approach on data from developing countries in the
early 1990s, Filmer and Pritchett find that PSH is statisti-
cally insignificant and contributes less than 0.2 % when
accounting for child mortality differences across countries
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once they control for income per capita and other covari-
ates [14]. These results are echoed by Wagstaff and Claeson
who, when treating PSH as endogenous, found that there is
not a statistically significant relationship between PSH and
health outcomes [5].
In sharp contrast, other studies find statistically and
economically significant results using similar methods to
those of Filmer and Pritchett. Using a set of developed
and developing countries, Bokhari et al. find the mean
elasticity of PSH with respect to U5M and MMR to
be −0.33 and −0.50 respectively [15]. Similar results were
found by Anyanwu and Erhijakpor who, looking at just
SSA countries, found the elasticities of PSH with respect
to infant mortality (IMR) and U5M to range from −0.17
to −0.22 and from −0.17 to −0.25, respectively [19]. Gupta
et al. also finds PSH to be a good predictor of good health
when looking at developing countries and countries in
transition. Controlling for the composition of health ex-
penditure, they find the elasticity of PSH with respect to
U5M to be −0.29 [20].
Similar conflicts in findings are found in the literature
of the influence of PSH on life expectancy. Using panel
data from 1995 to 2010 covering 44 countries in SSA,
Novignon and colleagues [4] find that health care expend-
iture significantly influences health status through improv-
ing life expectancy at birth. Specifically, they find that a 1 %
increase in PSH leads to an improvement in life expectancy
by approximately 1 year [4]. Similar findings are obtained
by Akinkugbe and Afeikhena [21] for SSA, Middle East and
North Africa [21]. There are also contrasting findings. For
example, Shaw and colleagues find PSH insignificant in
influencing life expectancy for 29 OECD countries for
the period 1960 to 1999 [22]. Bayati and colleagues
reaches the same conclusion for East Mediterranean
region for the period 1995 to 2007 [23].
The differences in the findings of studies reviewed
above (and others in the literature) may reflect different
sets of countries covered by studies, different time-
period considered and different instruments used. More
importantly, these differences could also reflect the omis-
sion of important confounders, particularly governance-
related variables like intra-sectoral allocation, level of effi-
ciency and corruption. Governance not only exerts an inde-
pendent influence on health outcomes [24–27], but also
mediates the impact of PSH on health outcomes. Therefore
allocation of funds to the health sector in the setting of
poor governance may be insufficient to improve health out-
comes [28]. Indeed, poor intra sectoral allocation, poor
targeting and inefficiency in delivery are among the rea-
sons for the negligible impact of PSH on health [5, 6].
Novignon and colleagues point out that it is possible
for population health to worsen even as health care ex-
penditure increases in the face of resource misalloca-
tion and poor management [4]. Therefore, it is very
likely that governance may explain the rather surprising
lack of association between PSH and outcomes ob-
served in some studies [29]. Rajkumar and Swaroop
provide a demonstration of this point. They studied the
differences in outcomes of public health spending in
the presence of varying levels of quality of governance
and report that good governance improves the impact
of public spending on child mortality [30]. They found
that 1 percentage point increase in the share of PSH in
GDP lowers U5M rate by 0.32 % in countries with good
governance (as measured by a corruption index),
0.20 % in countries with average governance, and has
no impact in countries with weak governance. Lewis
has also shown that good governance is important
in health care delivery and that returns to investments
in health are low where governance issues are not
addressed [29].
It has been suggested governance affects health through
two main channels. Its indirect effect on national income,
(corruption reduces economic growth [31]) and therefore
on household income and the determinants of health and
directly on the health care sector. In more developed coun-
tries governance has a positive effect on health through the
healthcare sector while in less developed countries good
governance affects health mainly through its indirect im-
pact on income i.e., the income channel predominates [32].
Methods
Measures of quality of governance
Governance refers to the manner in which public officials
and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to
shape public policy and provide public goods and services
[33]. The term governance is so multifaceted that several
indicators have been developed to try and capture its
different dimensions. In this paper, we employ the World
Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank, which
are defined in Table 1 below.
The WGIs are measured on a scale of scores (in standard
deviations) from −2.5 to 2.5. It has been argued that gov-
ernance scores are inherently subjective and likely biased
since they are largely perception-based [12, 30]. However,
the construction of WGI measures minimizes this bias
since they aggregate findings from a diverse range of
surveys conducted by institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations and international organi-
zations. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the
risk of bias due to significant differences between data
providers, their aims and their survey/aggregation
methods that may be associated with the underlying
data is minimized [31]. They are thus a reasonable ap-
proximation to the quality of governance. SSA coun-
tries generally have poor governance scores on all the
dimensions, with mean scores that are lower than the
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rest of the world regions. The means core for the re-
gion, on the different dimensions, is about −0.7.
Demand for health capital: a simplified Grossman model
Health outcomes can be seen as outcomes of a health
production process or function. The health production
function used in this paper is based on Grossman’s [34]
model of the demand for health. In this model, health is
demanded for two purposes: consumption and invest-
ment. Health as an investment commodity is an import-
ant form of human capital. The core assumption of the
model is that an individual inherits an initial stock of health
capital that depreciates with time and can be increased
through investment. Such gross investment is a function of
a household’s own time, market goods like medical care,
diet, exercise, recreation and housing, and “environmental
variables” like education. An investment in health increases
one’s stock of health, which improves health outcomes such
as “healthy time”, life expectancy and reduces child mortal-
ity [34]. We modify the original Grossman’s micro-level
model to a macro-level model and include, among the de-
terminants of health, upstream factors such as public
spending on health and quality of governance.
Estimation strategy
We specified “health production function” in which a
country’s health outcomes (H) depend on income per
capita (Y), public spending on health (PSH), quality of
governance (QoG) and a vector of other socioeconomic
status (SES) indicators. That is:
H ¼ h Y ; PSH ;QoG; SESð Þ ð1Þ
For estimation purposes, we derived from this health
production the following multivariate regression of the
determinants of health outcomes. For the ith country in
year t, we have that
Hit ¼ αþ β1 lnY it þ β2 lnPSHit þ β3QoGit
þ γSESit þ εit : ð2Þ
H in the present context represents (natural log of )
under-five mortality (U5M) and life expectancy at
birth (LE). U5M is the probability of dying before the
age of five, measured as number of deaths before fifth
birthday per 1000 live births. It is regarded as one of
the best indicators of child health and the state of
primary health care [12, 15]. LE is the number of
years an individual can expect to live at birth. Under-
five mortality and life expectancy are generally used
as aggregate measures of a population’s health status.
Income (Y) is measured as gross domestic product
per capita (GDPpc), expressed in purchasing power
parity terms. GDPpc measures the mean income per
person and reflects a country’s state of economic
growth/development and is expected to have negative
impact on U5M and positive impact on LE. PSH is
public spending on health, measured as a percentage
of GDP. It is an indicator of public investment in the
health sector and in the citizen’s human capital.
These expenditures are therefore expected to have
negative effects on U5M and positive impact on LE.
QoG is the quality of governance and includes five of
the six governance indicators taken from the World-
wide Governance Indicators (see Table 1). The ex-
cluded indicator is political stability which we thought
to be least closely to health outcomes. We estimate
eq. 2 with each of these indicators being used, in turn, as a
measure of quality of governance. SES is a vector of socio-
economic status. It includes female literacy, sanitation,
immunization, urbanization and number of physicians.
QoG and SES are expected to have negative effects
onU5M and positive impact on LE.
Income and public spending on health are in natural
log. This serves several purposes: it takes care of the
nonlinearity in the relationship between these variables
Table 1 Definitions of dimensions of governance
Dimension of Governance What it captures -
Control of corruption Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests
Government effectiveness Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies
Political stability Perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism
Regulatory quality Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development
Rule of law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
Voice and accountability Perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
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and health outcomes; provides nice interpretation of
the coefficients as elasticities in the case of U5M
(which is also in natural log form) and semi-elasticity
in the case of LE (which is in levels); and, makes the
results easily comparable to those of previous studies.
To account for the modifying effect of quality of govern-
ance on the impact of PSH on health outcomes, we intro-
duced an interaction term between them. Therefore, we
also estimated the following regression equation:
Hit ¼ αþ β1 lnY it þ β2 lnPSHit þ β3QoGit
þ β4 QoGit lnPSHitð Þ þ γSESit þ εit ð3Þ
In order to further elaborate on the modifying effect of
quality of governance, we examine the total effect of
PSH on health outcomes, both directly and indirect
through QoG. To do this, it must be observed that the
overall elasticity of public health spending with respect
to health outcomes from regression eq. (3) is:
∂Hit
∂ lnPSHit
¼ β2 þ β4QoGit ð4Þ
That is, the overall effect of PSH on health outcomes
is the sum of the direct effect (β2) and indirect effect
through quality of governance (β4 *QoGit). It is evident
from eq. (4) that the impact of health spending on
health outcomes is dependent on the quality of govern-
ance. We calculate this effect at three levels: the mean
score of governance for each indicator (mean score), at
one standard deviation below (lower score) and above
the mean (upper score).
Several statistical issues may arise in estimating regres-
sion eqs. (2) and (3). Firstly, given the panel dataset
used, we have to verify presence of country-specific fixed
effects. We employ the Hausman test to choose between
random effects and fixed effects estimation for each regres-
sion that was run. Secondly, heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation can lead to insignificant estimates. To take care of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we use clustering
which renders the standard errors robust to these two
problems. Thirdly, the relationship between PSH and health
outcomes and between income and health outcomes can
run in both directions. That is, changes in PSH or income
may lead to, and/or react to, changes in health outcomes.
That is, health spending and income are potentially en-
dogenous and this may bias the estimates. We therefore
used the instrumental variable (IV) approach (i.e., two
staged least squares) to control for this endogeneity (reverse
causality). Following Filmer and Pritchett, we instrument
PSH by military spending in neighbouring countries [14].
Following Bokhari and colleagues we use consumption-
investment ratio as the instrument for GDP per capita [15].
We test validity of these instruments Sargan’s over-
identification test, which tests whether the instrument
are uncorrelated with the error term.
We use data from 43 Sub Saharan African countries
from 1995 to 2011, extracted from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators and Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators databases. This choice of sample period
was necessitated by the availability of quality of govern-
ance data.
Results
Based on the Hausman specification tests, the fixed ef-
fects model was favoured over the random effects model.
The results presented in this section are thus based on
the fixed effects model. Table 2 below presents results of
eq. (2) with under-five mortality as the dependent vari-
able. The top panel of Table 2 shows the estimates for
eq. (2) with each of the five indicators of governance
used in turn. Guided by previous studies, the vector of
socio-economic status included female literacy, sanita-
tion, access to safe water, immunisation, urbanisation
rates and physicians per capita. Of these, only female lit-
eracy and sanitation were significant at times. Given the
statistical dictates of a parsimonious model in explaining
any phenomenon, and the mixed results from previous
studies regarding the significance of the socioeconomic
variables, there was no obvious gain for including them.
Therefore, with the exception of female literacy and sani-
tation, we did not include them.
The results in the top panel are in conformity with
those in the literature regarding the negative impact of
income and female literacy on child mortality. The in-
come elasticity of under-five mortality ranges from −0.37
to −0.39, magnitudes which are in tandem with previous
studies such as those by Filmer and Pritchett [14], Gupta
et al. [20] and summarized by O’Hare and colleagues [16].
These elasticities mean that if income increases by, say,
10 % then there will be a decrease in under-five mortality
of between 3.7 % and 3.9 %, holding all else constant. Fe-
male literacy is also significant statistically but the elastici-
ties are smaller relative to those of income. Public
spending on health is insignificant. Similarly, sanitation
and measures of quality of governance are insignificant.
These results may however be misleading in the presence
of endogeneity of income and public health spending. To
correct the endogeneity bias, we use the instrumental vari-
able estimation technique. The results are shown in the
bottom panel of Table 2. Income and female literacy are
again negative and statistically significant. It is noteworthy,
however, that while the elasticity of female literacy has
almost stayed the same, the income elasticity of under-five
mortality has increased to the range −0.45 to −0.49. That is,
if income increases by, say, 10 % then under-five mortality
will fall by between 4.5 % and 4.9 %, holding all else
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constant. This means that, in the presence of endogeneity,
the estimates for income elasticities were biased downwards.
Further, with endogeneity bias corrected, public
spending on health becomes a significant determinant
of child mortality. Its elasticity ranges from −0.09 to −0.11,
depending on the measure used for QoG. That is, if
PSH increases by, say, 10 % then under-five mortality
will fall by between 0.9 % and 1.1 %, holding all other
factors constant. From these results, income elasticity
of U5M is thus roughly four times as high as PSH
elasticity of U5M. This finding supports the widely
held argument that income is the more dominant de-
terminant of the two. Possible reasons for the lower
effect of public spending includes poor targeting and/
or institutional inefficiencies such as leakage in public
spending and weak institutional capacity and substitu-
tion effect between public and private (out of pocket)
spending on health [30].
With the two-staged least squares, all the indicators of
governance except control of corruption are significant, im-
plying that quality of governance is an important influence
on child mortality. The estimated coefficients range from
−0.08 to −0.18, meaning that a unit (one standard devi-
ation) improvement in governance leads to a decline in
child mortality of between 8 % and 18 %. Improving quality
of governance, therefore, could have a considerable direct
impact in reducing child mortality. These results are con-
sistent with those of previous studies by Lin et al. [24],
Kaufmann et al. [26] and Helleröd et al. [27].
As pointed out in the methods section, the instrumen-
tal variable approach provides a good remedy for endo-
geneity. However, this approach works only when the
instruments are valid. Otherwise, the remedy may be
worse than the problem. The instruments used are valid
since the Sargan’s statistic is insignificant as per the
p-values shown in the third-from-last row of the
Table 2 Regression results for Under-five mortality
OLS
GDP per capita −0.381** (0.136) −0.391** (0.138) −0.379** (0.134) −0.371** (0.132) −0.388** (0.136)
Public Health Expenditure −0.103 (0.058) −0.104 (0.057) −0.102 (0.058) −0.095 (0.056) −0.110 (0.059)
Female literacy −0.008*** (0.001) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.008*** (0.001)
Sanitation −0.297 (0.174) −0.301 (0.173) −0.297 (0.177) −0.295 (0.179) −0.292 (0.181)
Government Effectiveness −0.002 (0.070)
Regulatory Quality 0.042 (0.074)
Control of Corruption −0.006 (0.065)
Rule of Law −0.063 (0.089)
Voice and Accountability 0.043 (0.063)
Constant 8.894*** (0.881) 9.002*** (0.889) 8.876*** (0.851) 8.791*** (0.850) 8.948*** (0.866)
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68
F 36.31 37.33 36.53 38.39 38.34
Observations 374 374 374 374 374
IV
GDP per capita −0.487*** (0.082) −0.484*** (0.081) −0.479*** (0.083) −0.450*** (0.080) −0.489*** (0.082)
Public Health Expenditure −0.094** (0.030) −0.101*** (0.030) −0.098** (0.031) −0.087** (0.029) −0.114*** (0.031)
Female literacy −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001)
Sanitation −0.046 (0.068) −0.078 (0.064) −0.093 (0.065) −0.062 (0.063) −0.072 (0.065)
Government Effectiveness −0.096* (0.047)
Regulatory Quality −0.108* (0.043)
Control of Corruption −0.015 (0.037)
Rule of Law −0.183*** (0.046)
Voice and Accountability 0.082* (0.040)
Sargan (p-value) 0.369 0.342 0.241 0.313 0.205
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68
F 100.37 102.02 97.60 108.58 100.46
Observations 223 223 223 223 223
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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table. The instrumental variable results can therefore
be taken with confidence.
The analysis above is repeated for life expectancy. The
results are shown in Table 3 below. For the instrumental
variable regression, income has coefficients of between
2.01 and 2.83. This means that an increase in income, of
say 10 %, adds between 0.2 years (over two months) and
0.3 years (nearly four months) to life expectancy. In-
creases in PSH also adds to life expectancy, albeit a
lower contribution relative to that of income. Its coeffi-
cients are in the range of 0.35 to 0.60. The impact of
governance is very varied, ranging from 1.29 to 4.45.
That is, a unit improvement in governance adds between
1 and 4 years to life expectancy, all else being equal.
To take into account the modifying effect of quality of
governance on PSH, we run the regression with the
interaction between the two factors (eq. 3). To
economise on space, we only report regression results of
the instrumental variable approach. Table 4 show results
from regression (eg. 3) for under-five mortality. The re-
sults are broadly similar to those of regressions without
the interaction term. Our focus in these regressions is on
the interaction terms. For under-five mortality, significant
interactions exist between public spending on health and
government effectiveness, rule of law and, voice and
accountability.
For these interaction terms, a one unit improvement
in the indicator of governance, leads to between 6 to 8 %
increase in the impact of public health spending in redu-
cing child mortality. This suggests that improving govern-
ance enhances the influence of PSH on child mortality.
That is, if governance improved the same amount of
resources spent on the health sector could reduce U5M
further. This is shown in Table 5 where the effect on
Table 3 Regression results for life expectancy
OLS
GDP per capita 3.582* (2.068) 3.430 (2.215) 3.103* (1.548) 3.254* (1.688) 3.510* (2.080)
Public Health Expenditure 0.195 (0.714) 0.337 (0.713) 0.261 (0.706) 0.092 (0.687) 0.232 (0.784)
Female literacy 0.101*** (0.030) 0.093*** (0.029) 0.097*** (0.029) 0.101*** (0.030) 0.093*** (0.029)
Sanitation 2.909* (1.635) 3.494** (1.574) 3.525** (1.519) 3.474** (1.520) 3.663** (1.450)
Government Effectiveness 2.007** (0.899)
Regulatory Quality 0.833 (1.283)
Control of Corruption 1.190 (0.948)
Rule of Law 2.362* (1.234)
Voice and Accountability 0.776 (1.151)
Constant 14.178 (14.12) 12.993 (15.23) 15.204 (12.85) 14.896 (13.32) 11.851 (13.77)
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.44
F 25.01 28.15 25.76 24.45 24.85
Observations 372 372 372 372 372
IV
GDP per capita 2.017* (1.267) 1.876 (1.616) 2.521* (1.683) 2.052* (1.602) 2.825** (1.688)
Public Health Expenditure 0.601*** (0.264) 0.803 (0.595) 0.622*** (0.201) 0.349* (0.590) 0.690 (0.637)
Female literacy 0.131*** (0.020) 0.112*** (0.020) 0.125*** (0.021) 0.134*** (0.020) 0.122*** (0.021)
Sanitation 0.551 (1.364) 1.832 (1.281) 2.306* (1.321) 1.550 (1.268) 2.342* (1.348)
Government Effectiveness 3.602*** (0.942)
Regulatory Quality 3.522*** (0.847)
Control of Corruption 1.289* (0.743)
Rule of Law 4.448*** (0.923)
Voice and Accountability 0.124 (0.817)
Sargan (p-value) 0.481 0.237 0.174 0.290 0.187
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.28
F 28.70 29.55 24.99 31.44 24.04
Observations 223 223 223 223 223
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Makuta and O’Hare BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:932 Page 7 of 11
under-five mortality of the same public expenditure is
assessed at various levels of quality of governance, using
eq. (4). We call these levels lower (one standard deviation
below the mean score), mean (mean score of a measure of
governance) and upper (one standard deviation above the
mean score). For countries with good governance (i.e.,
above the mean score), the elasticity of under-five mortal-
ity with respect to public health spending is about −0.17
to −0.19, while in countries with poor governance the
elasticity is about −0.09. This result suggests that im-
proved quality of governance improve the efficiency with
which public spending on health can be converted to bet-
ter health outcomes. Our results concur with those of Raj-
kumar and Swaroop [30]. For a set of 91 developed and
developing countries, they find that a 1 percentage point
increase in the share of public health spending in GDP
lowers the under-5 mortality rate by 0.32 % in countries
with good governance (as measured by a corruption index
and bureaucratic quality), 0.20 % in countries with average
governance, and has no impact in countries with weak
governance. Our results are slightly lower, probably be-
cause we have used one developing region where govern-
ance scores are particularly low.
Turning to life expectancy, significant interactions exist
between public spending on health and control of corrup-
tion, rule of law and, voice and accountability as shown in
Table 6 below. For these interaction terms, a one unit
improvement in the indicator of governance increases the
impact of public health spending in lengthening life ex-
pectancy by 0.02 years and 0.031 years. That is, the same
amount of resources spent on the health sector could
increase life expectancy if quality of governance improves.
This is shown in Table 7 where the effect on life expect-
ancy of the same public expenditure is assessed at various
levels of quality of governance, using eq. (4). For countries
with good governance (i.e., above the mean score), the
semi-elasticity of life expectancy with respect to public
health spending is about 6, while in countries with bad
governance the elasticity is about 3.
Discussion
On the whole, the results show that public spending on
health is an important determinant of health outcomes in
SSA. The direct elasticity of PSH with respect to under-
five mortality is between −0.09 and −0.11 while its semi-
elasticity with respect to life expectancy is between 0.35
and 0.60. These results broadly confirm the findings of
those studies by Gupta [20], Bokhari [15], Anyanwu [19]
and Novignon [4] who found PSH to be significant in
Table 4 Instrumental Variable Regression results for Under-five mortality - with interactions
GDP per capita −0.449*** (0.085) −0.461*** (0.083) −0.474*** (0.090) −0.427*** (0.082) −0.526*** (0.082)
Public Health Expenditure −0.128*** (0.037) −0.126*** (0.036) −0.100** (0.033) −0.110** (0.035) −0.071* (0.036)
Female literacy −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001) −0.009*** (0.001)
Sanitation −0.071 (0.070) −0.094 (0.066) −0.095 (0.067) −0.072 (0.063) −0.051 (0.065)
Government Effectiveness −0.063* (0.034)
Public Health Expenditure * Government effectiveness −0.069* (0.041)
Regulatory Quality −0.062 (0.057)
Public Health Expenditure * Regulatory Quality −0.056 (0.047)
Control of Corruption −0.009 (0.057)
Public Health Expenditure * Control of Corruption −0.007 (0.044)
Rule of Law −0.146** (0.056)
Public Health Expenditure * Rule of Law −0.054* (0.032)
Voice and Accountability −0.047* (0.023)
Public Health Expenditure * Voice and Accountability −0.087* (0.038)
Sargan (p-value) 0.371 0.379 0.242 0.348 0.244
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68
F 84.55 85.41 80.91 90.86 86.31
Observations 223 223 223 223 223
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 5 effect of PSH on U5M at different levels of QoG
lowera meanb upperc
Government effectiveness −0.09346 −0.13555 −0.17764
rule of law −0.09256 −0.13741 −0.18226
voice and accountability −0.09298 −0.14321 −0.19344
Notes: aelasticity computed at one standard deviation below the sample mean
score; belasticity computed at the sample mean score; celasticity computed at
one standard deviation above the sample mean score
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influencing health outcomes. It is also noteworthy that the
effect on health outcomes implied by these figures is small
relative to the effect of income. For example, our results
suggest that income elasticity of U5M is roughly four
times as high as PSH elasticity of U5M. Possible reasons
for the lower effect of public spending includes poor tar-
geting and/or institutional inefficiencies such as leakage in
public spending and weak institutional capacity and sub-
stitution effect between public and private (out of pocket)
spending on health [30].
In addition, the impact of PSH on health outcomes is
significantly mediated by QoG. Specifically, government
effectiveness, rule of law and accountability mediates the
impact of PSH on U5M while control of corruption, rule
of law and accountability mediates impact of PSH on
LE. The results are summarised in Table 8 below.
For countries with higher quality of governance (i.e.,
above the mean score), the overall elasticity of under-
five mortality with respect to public health spending is
about -.17 to -.19, while in countries with lower quality
of governance the elasticity is about −0.09. For life ex-
pectancy, countries with higher quality of governance
(i.e., above the mean score), the overall semi-elasticity of
life expectancy with respect to public health spending is
about 6, while in countries with bad governance the
elasticity is about 3. These results suggest that the same
amount of resources is twice as effective in improving
health outcome in countries with higher quality of govern-
ance as in those countries with lower quality of
governance.
Table 6 Instrumental Variable Regression results for Life expectancy- with interactions
GDP per capita 2.825* (1.695) 2.478 (1.649) 3.048* (1.801) 1.931 (1.632) 3.120* (1.654)
Public Health Expenditure 0.968 (0.744) 0.645 (0.718) 0.718* (0.457) 1.187* (0.696) 1.593** (0.721)
Adult literacy 0.128*** (0.020) 0.108*** (0.020) 0.116*** (0.021) 0.131*** (0.020) 0.113*** (0.020)
Sanitation 0.020 (1.396) 1.398 (1.301) 1.605 (1.343) 1.161 (1.265) 1.617 (1.308)
Government Effectiveness 4.906*** (1.247)
Public Health Expenditure * Government effectiveness −1.427 (0.901)
Regulatory Quality 4.749*** (1.139)
Public Health Expenditure * Regulatory Quality 1.504 (0.941)
Control of Corruption 3.219*** (1.142)
Public Health Expenditure * Control of Corruption 1.946** (0.882)
Rule of Law 5.827*** (1.106)
Public Health Expenditure * Rule of Law 2.009** (0.914)
Voice and Accountability 2.214** (0.943)
Public Health Expenditure * Voice and Accountability 3.080*** (0.769)
Sargan (p-value) 0.441 0.179 0.122 0.215 0.198
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.33
F 24.50 25.23 22.02 27.49 24.16
Observations 223 223 223 223 223
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 7 Effect of PSH on LE at different levels of QoG
Lowera Meanb Upperc
Control of corruption 3.2901 4.45815 5.6262
rule of law 2.9742 4.2417 5.5092
voice and accountability 2.9859 4.4055 5.8251
Notes: asemi-elasticity computed at one standard deviation below the sample
mean score; bsemi- elasticity computed at the sample mean score; csemi-elasticity
computed at one standard deviation above the sample mean score
Table 8 Effect of PSH on U5M and LE at different levels of QoG
– key findings
Under-five mortality Life expectancy
Lowera Upperb Lowerc Upperd
Government effectiveness −0.09346 −0.17764
Rule of law −0.09256 −0.18226 2.9742 5.5092
Voice and accountability −0.09298 −0.19344 2.9859 5.8251
Control of corruption 3.2901 5.6262
The overall effect of the same amount of PSH on health outcomes is
dependent on the quality of governance in a country; it will have more impact
in a country with good governance and minimal impact in a poorly governed
country in SSA. The same increase in PSH is twice as effective in reducing U5M
and increasing LE in countries with higher QoG as with lower QoG, as shown
in the table above
Notes: aelasticity computed at one standard deviation below the sample mean
score; bsemi-elasticity computed at one standard deviation above the sample
mean score; csemi-elasticity computed at one standard deviation below the
sample mean score; dsemi-elasticity computed at one standard deviation
above the sample mean score
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These findings provide one possible explanation for
the surprising result that public spending on health often
does not yield the expected improvement in health out-
comes. As highlighted in the literature review, some
studies, including the influential paper by Filmer and
Pritchett [14], have found insignificant or an extremely
small impact of public spending. Our findings show that
the quality of governance may be the explanation and
this is supported by Rajkumar and Swaroop [30], who
studied the impact of public spending on development
outcomes, including under-five mortality, at different
levels of quality of governance. Their findings show that
while public spending on health is effective in reducing
U5M in well-governed countries, it has virtually no im-
pact in poorly governed countries. Probable explanations
for this observation is that improving QoG leads to better
allocation of resources, better targeting and enhances
more efficient use of available resources. As Wagstaff and
Claeson [5] point out, better governance leads to better
policies and more efficient institutions, hence strengthen-
ing the link between PSH and health outcomes. Similarly,
Lewis [29] concludes from a study of 119 developing
countries that governance is important in ensuring effect-
ive health care delivery and that returns to investments in
health are low where governance issues are not addressed.
Apart from mediating the effectiveness of PSH, QoG
has its own direct effect on health outcomes. All the in-
dicators of governance except control of corruption are
directly significant in reducing under-five mortality, with
elasticities ranging from −0.09 to −0.11 while for life ex-
pectancy, all indicators except government effectiveness
are significant, with semi elasticities ranging from 1.29
to 4.45. The importance of quality of governance for
health is echoed in the literature by Kaufmann et al. [26],
Wagstaff and Claeson [5], Lewis [29], Holmberg and
Rothsten [35] and Halleröd et al. [27] among others.
Population health can be related to QoG in several ways.
Firstly, since a country’s QoG is positively related to eco-
nomic performance, high QoG should result in more eco-
nomic growth, which should imply better food, better
housing, access to safe water and sanitation, less strenuous
working conditions, fewer people living under destitute
conditions and so forth [35]. Secondly, quality health care
service delivery is dependent on quality of policies and
administrative institutions, both of which improve with
QoG. Higher QoG should result in more efficient use and
better-targeting of resources in healthcare delivery and
thus better population health.
Conclusions
Public health spending improves health outcomes. Its
impact is mediated by quality of governance, having the
higher impact on health outcomes in countries with bet-
ter governance and lower impact in countries with poor
governance. This provides one possible explanation for
the insignificant or extremely small impact of public
spending observed in some studies, namely; that ineffi-
ciency of public spending may be, in actual fact, a result of
poor governance. Governance is important in ensuring
effective health care delivery and returns to investments in
health are low where governance issues are not addressed.
It is therefore imperative that SSA governments improve
the quality of governance as one way of improving health
outcomes.
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